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The shadow economy encompasses all areas of economic activity, which are ofﬁ-
cially considered inconsistent in comparison to the ideological prevalent form of eco-
nomic organisation. The deﬁnition of ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ economy is not
ﬁrmly ﬁxed but subject to change and varying criteria. There is a whole range of
measuring methods adopted according to various principles. The text shows the con-
nection between the shadow economy and economic policy, what stimulates growth
of the shadow economy and what measures can be taken to inﬂuence the way it
develops. After a short introduction, deﬁnition and measuring are explained. Section 3
is dedicated to the situation in Croatia, where various methods are explained fol-
lowed by section 4 which explains the links between the shadow economy and eco-
nomic crisis. The article ﬁnishes with conclusions and recommendations for
improvement.
Keywords: ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ economy; tax evasion; economic develop-
ment; Croatia; tax culture
JEL classiﬁcation: E6, H2, I3
1. Introduction
The shadow economy includes economic activities which are considered inconsistent in
comparison to the ideological prevalent form of economic organisation. The informal
economy encompasses all activities that are formally legal but ideologically suspect;
hence there is an ofﬁcial tendency to discriminate amongst them and give them an infe-
rior status. Activities in the ‘hidden’ economy consist of undeclared legal production of
goods and services, production of illegal goods and services, and concealed income in
kind. The ﬁrst is the largest component of the shadow economy and covers productive
activities that are quite legal in themselves but which are concealed from public authori-
ties to avoid taxes and similar charges.
The deﬁnition of the ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ economy, as is the case with so
many economic phenomena, is not ﬁrmly ﬁxed but subject to change and varying cri-
teria. Thus there is the legal one (illegal economy), the moral one (its illegal nature and
the fact that it contravenes the accepted rules of business), the institutional one (income
realised through this kind of operation is not included in routine record-keeping and
statistics), the quantitative one (those economic activities which could be measured in
some way but have so far never been analysed), and ﬁnally, the ideological one, which
depends, to a great extent, on the prevalent economic system in society and correspond-
ing economic policy.
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The informal economy is present in all societies irrespective of their dominant social
and political system. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in the scope and
form that the informal economy may assume in each society. There are as many non-
compliant activities as there are rules to be violated. It has been shown that underground
economies comprise similar types of noncompliant behaviours. For example, when ﬁscal
rules are violated, tax evasion and beneﬁt fraud behaviours are said to comprise the
unreported economy. As suggested earlier, rule violators, mindful of penalties, will typi-
cally seek to conceal their behaviour from public authorities. When income-producing
activities are concealed and thus cannot be appropriately included in national income
accounts, accounting conventions are violated, creating an unrecorded economy. Those
activities involving the abuse of public ofﬁce for private gain constitute the corruption
economy. More generally, those activities that violate the rules prohibiting extortion,
ﬁnancial fraud, smuggling, organised crime, and theft of state property are examples of
illegal economy activities.
Although in the majority of developed countries the volume of the informal econ-
omy is not considered large compared to the total gross national product, neglecting this
phenomenon leads to a signiﬁcant disproportion in certain items of national accounts,
misinterpretation of ofﬁcial statistic’s records, and consequently national economic pol-
icy. Hence, in the majority of countries estimates concerning the growth of the informal
economy are probably more important than estimates of its volume.
The motivation of research is to show the connection between the shadow economy
and economic policy, what stimulates growth of the shadow economy and what mea-
sures can be taken to inﬂuence the way it develops. This paper deals with the estimation
of the shadow economy in Croatia and its size over the observed period. The aim of the
article is to provide trends, causes and possible remedies for the shadow economy.
While the share of unreported labour is decreasing in upward phases of economic
cycles, the share of inaccurate reporting (under-reporting of income by ﬁrms and indi-
viduals) is increasing. On the other hand, in the recession period, there is evidence of a
rising impact of unreported labour. The article points to the main factors behind unofﬁ-
cial economy growth during recessions.
After this short introduction, deﬁnitions and measurement issues are explained. Sec-
tion 3 is dedicated to the situation in Croatia, followed by section 4 which explains the
links between the shadow economy and institutions and economic performance. The text
ﬁnishes with conclusions and recommendations for improvement.
2. Deﬁnition and measuring
As mentioned, there is a whole range of deﬁnitions adopted according to various princi-
ples. One of the broader deﬁnitions accepted by Feige (1990) considers all economic
entities as part of the ofﬁcial economy, providing their actions are performed according
to the established institutionalised ‘rules of the game’. Only economic entities which do
not operate according to institutionalised rules in the market can be considered a part of
the unofﬁcial (or ‘grey’) economy. The trend of the institutionalised economy (North,
1989), which studies relationship between economic development and economic institu-
tions, reveals the fact that institutions (which provide the basis for establishing the rules
of behaviour for economies entities) deﬁne the development and structural composition
of the ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial economy in a given country. The correlation between the
economy and institutions is deﬁned through the level of transaction costs associated with
any kind of economic exchange. The differences associated with the function of the
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ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial economy in fact determine their signiﬁcance in the process of eco-
nomic development. In most cases, however, distinction between the ofﬁcial and unofﬁ-
cial economy is not that simple. The two are interconnected and interlaced even in
highly developed market economies with a precise and clear institutional framework
and transparent written and non-written customs of conduct for economic entities in the
market. This interdependency is even more complex and pronounced in countries in
transition where an institutionalised framework has yet to be built. Probably the most
useful is the deﬁnition of total economic activity as a sum of an observed and imputed
unobserved component provided by Feige and Urban (2008):
Y = YR + YUR = YRO + YIUI + YUR
Where Y = total economic activity (TEA)
YR = recorded economic activity (measured output; GDP),
YRO = recorded observed economic activity,
YIUI = recorded unobserved economic activity,
YUR = unrecorded activity.
They deﬁned the unobserved economy (YU) as the sum of unrecorded and recorded
unobserved income: YU = YUR + YIUI
The scope of the shadow economy is usually estimated by: (1) a monetary approach
or Tanzi method where underground transactions are conducted only on a cash basis;
(2) ofﬁcial statistics with arbitrary estimates; (3) calculation and analysis of the structure
of the informal economy (the share of the informal economy in gross national product
cannot give an idea of the structure of goods it produces and services it renders. In
order to gain a better insight into the causes of this phenomenon it is important to
observe where the informal economy is more prominent and where its share is small or
negligible; (4) labour input methods based on comparing the rates of activity in longer
period or among different countries (if rates of activity are decreasing, it can be due to
withdrawing from formal to informal sector); (5) discrepancy method using differences
between income and consumption (if consumption is bigger than income – on the level
of national economy or on micro level of particular household – this part of income can
be realised in informal economy); (6) using the data from national accounts; (7) better
control of taxpayers and tax obligations; (8) examining the opinions of experts for a par-
ticular part of the economy; (9) latent variable methods or methods of causes where the
reasons that stimulate for the participation in the shadow economy are analysed: search
for determinants (e.g. real and perceived tax burden, the burden of regulation, tax
immorality, etc.) and indicators (male participation rate, hours worked and growth of
real GNP). Then, calculate undeclared work with the aid of econometric tools such as
MIMIC or DYMIMIC; (10) global indicators methods electricity consumption where
the difference between the growth rate of electric consumption (a proxy for the growth
rate of TEA) and the growth rate of measured GDP yields an approximation of the
growth rate of unrecorded income; (11) methodology for estimate of non-exhaustiveness
of national accounts in Croatia based on the Eurostat approach – the classiﬁcation of
non-exhaustiveness types in the national accounts is based on various characteristics of
the producer, i.e. the way in which data is obtained from producers. The classiﬁcation
of non-exhaustiveness types in the national accounts is presented in Table 1. Regardless
424 P. Bejaković
of the mutual exclusivity of individual forms, in practice there can also be cases in
which individual types of non-exhaustiveness in the national accounts overlap.
This is not a mandatory classiﬁcation; rather, freedom is allowed for the countries
taking part in the project to adapt it in line with their own economic conditions and leg-
islation. It is also possible to use other lines of division between the recorded (declared)
economies in various countries. Taking practicality into consideration, it is much more
important to cover all the forms in which it shows up than to solve the classiﬁcatory
problem completely.
In the majority of countries estimates concerning the growth of the shadow economy
are probably more important than estimates of its volume (Ott, 2002). The shadow
economy may (and indeed does) play an important positive role as a stimulus for social
development, primary as an important economic cushion, free from control and taxation,
that alleviates the social consequences of transition period, struggle against inﬂation and
economic restructuring. These consequences would be more severe without the shadow
economy. The unofﬁcial economy inﬂuences the successful implementation of the eco-
nomic policy (Feige, 1979). The greater the shadow economy, the greater its inﬂuence
on economic policy. Research has shown that this economy has reached signiﬁcant pro-
portions in many countries (Schneider, 2005; Tanzi, 1983).
3. Results for Croatia
3.1. Various approaches to the measurement
The Institute of Public Finance (Ott, 2002) in the Project The Underground Economy in
Croatia have applied various approaches to the measurement of The Underground Econ-
omy (UE): via the national accounts, monetary methods, LFSs, tax evasion. They have
attempted to evaluate the UE in individual industries, e.g. in agriculture, industry and
trade, tourism, foreign trade. In the text are also used results and data from Lovrinčević,
Mikulić, and Galić Nagyszombaty (2011), particularly related to the role of the unofﬁ-
cial economy during the time of the economic crisis.












Owners of companies, crafts
enterprises and similar
professions
21.33 14.14 65.52 0.00 0.00
Workers employed in state-
owned or mixed sector
17.54 67.68 6.03 0.00 0.00
Workers employed in the private
sector
11.14 14.14 28.45 0.00 0.00
Unpaid family workers 40.76 3.03 0.00 100.00 0.00
Own-account workers 9.24 1.01 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Crnkovic-Pozaic (1997).
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3.2. Discrepancy methods
Since 1990 Croatia has been marked by considerable changes in the statistical system
(research methods, and the actual concept), discontinuity in different statistical research,
high inﬂation in the early years, the creation of numerous new units with low statistical
discipline, and the disappearance of large business systems. Despite major efforts to
improve the quality and exhaustiveness of national accounting systems, it is widely
recognised that current statistical practice still fails to incorporate a wide range of unde-
clared work. As we await the much-anticipated improvement in the exhaustiveness of
national accounts, it becomes all the more important to pursue macro-economic mod-
elling estimates of the dynamic evolution of the unobserved economies and undeclared
work as an independent check on the veracity of new Statistical national accounts
(SNA) measures of undeclared work (UW). The estimation of undeclared work using
the discrepancy method in SNA gives signiﬁcantly lower levels in comparison with the
estimation by monetary methods (Lovrinčević, Marić et al., 2006). They believe that a
reason for the mentioned differences might be that the discrepancy method evaluates the
differences between two independent approaches to the assumption of Gross Domestic
Product while a signiﬁcant part of UW is left uncovered. United Nation (2003) using
Imputed Unobserved (NOE) Income YIUI/(GDP) ∗ 100, estimated that in Croatia the
share of UW was 8.9% in 1998 and 8.1% in 1999.
3.3. Labour input methods
The estimation of employment in the unofﬁcial economy realised by the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) is a good information source on employment in the unofﬁcial economy
due to the fact that the measurement unit is a household and shadow economy encom-
passes all areas of economic activity, which are ofﬁcially considered the individuals
within it. The target categories selected for the survey are: persons having an additional
activity besides their main job; unpaid family workers on the family estate, craft enter-
prise, independent profession or company; persons engaged in various activities in order
to earn their means of sustenance.1 The common name for this category is own-account
workers. Their activity is characterised by the fact that it ceases when they stop per-
forming it and that their production equipment is very limited; persons whose prevailing
status is different from the status they presently have, mainly including housewives, stu-
dents, pupils, retired persons and persons who do not usually work and persons who
cannot be classiﬁed into any of the above mentioned categories. The ﬁrst estimation
method used in this study did not allow an estimate of the ﬁrst of the aforementioned
categories which is of primary interest here. Some insight was shed on the rest of the
categories by the population census, which also numbered unpaid family workers and
own-account workers. All the categories surveyed worked at least one hour during the
reference week (November 1995) or were absent from work to which they could return.
Crnković-Pozaić (1997) calculated frequencies in the unofﬁcial economy according to
occupation at the highest aggregate level. According to this source, the level of the
unofﬁcial economy is 25.79% of total employment. Among the categories, 6.23% of the
population surveyed is engaged in additional business activities, 10.23% are unpaid
family workers, 2.3% are own-account workers and 7.02% are housewives, students,
retired persons and usually unemployed persons. The employment composition of unde-
clared work reads as follows: 39.7% are unpaid family workers, 27.2% are prevailingly
inactive groups, 24.2% are persons engaged in additional business activities and 8.9%
are own-account workers.
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Lovrinčević, Mikulić, and Niksić-Paulić (2002) stress that the main method for the
establishment of undeclared work derives from a failure to register subjects (in this case,
employment). In their survey they used the results of an analysis of data about employ-
ment from the Household Labour Force Survey (LFS) and data about employment from
the annual statistical reports that serve as a basis for the calculation of GDP. The num-
ber of employees per industry from the LFS was compared with the number of employ-
ees from the annual reports that are used for a calculation of GDP, as well as with the
data on the base of hours of work, or on the basis of full time work. The difference was
assumed to indicate unregistered or unreported employees. Since the results of the sur-
vey are reliable only at the level of area of industry (letter level), comparison was possi-
ble only at that level. However, in order to obtain an estimate about unregistered
employment at the level of National Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities (NCEA) tab-
ulation category, in each area we divided the difference in terms of tabulation categories
according to the number of employed persons in small units (small ﬁrms, owners of
trades and their employees). In this way it was assumed that those sections in which
there were more small units covered proportionately more unregistered employees. The
value of gross product, intermediate consumption and added value per employee made
by small entrepreneurs in the same branch with two to nine employees was associated
with the unregistered employees. By this method, the estimated grey economy deriving
from undeclared work is estimated. The gross added value created with this kind of
work came to HRK 7.4 billion in 1999 or HRK 8.3 billion in 1998, from which it
would appear that it is this form of undeclared work prevails in the Republic of Croatia.
3.4. Degree of participation method
Table 1 offers another insight into employment of undeclared work for the year 1995
(the only available survey of this type by Crnković-Pozaić, 1997). It deals with the sta-
tus of employment, in other words, whether a person is self-employed, an employee or
an unpaid family worker. Self-employed persons have been represented as owners or
co-owners of companies, crafts and trades, independent professionals and freelancers on
one hand and as own-account workers on the other. Employees are distinguished by the
ownership sector in which they are employed, and unpaid family workers stand by
themselves. Crnković-Pozaić (1997) analyses cross-referenced status in informal
employment with the individuals’ activity status.
Among persons undertaking undeclared work activities, the most numerous are
unpaid family workers (40.76%). This group is followed by the category of owners or
co-owners of companies and independent professions or agricultural estates with 21.3%.
Employees working predominantly in the state-owned or mixed ownership sector make
up 17.54% and 11.14% are engaged in additional activities in the private sector. The
remaining 9.24% are own-account workers.
3.5. Tanzi method
To measure the unofﬁcial economy by a monetaristic approach it is necessary to: (1)
measure the nominal GDP, which has not yet been done in the majority of countries;
(2) pay more attention to foreign currency and include it in future research on analytical
currency supply in the unofﬁcial economy; (3) research and monitoring the connection
between seasonal trends and the unofﬁcial economy in certain economic activities (such
as, for example, tourism); and (4) monitor all data series required for the monetaristic
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assessment of the unofﬁcial economy, which would make it possible to use this long
term method in calculating the size of the unofﬁcial economy, a procedure which is not
yet feasible in Croatia.
In transition countries, currency substitution (the substitution of foreign currency for
domestic currency as a medium of exchange) results in unofﬁcial or de facto dollarisa-
tion (Feige, 2003). Since foreign currency is widely thought to be used for undertaking
unrecorded transactions and undeclared work, we must await monetary estimates of
unrecorded income that include estimates foreign currencies in circulation in these coun-
tries (Feige, 2002). In the literature, two monetary methods of estimating UE dynamics
are familiar. The ﬁrst approach (sometimes called the Cagan method) is founded on the
link between demand for money and the level of tax pressure (Jankov, 1997; Schneider
& Ernste, 2000). Cagan’s method has been improved by Tanzi, who estimated the func-
tion of the demand for cash as a medium that is principally used in undeclared work.
Tanzi used different conventional determinations of the demand for money, such as
income, interest rates and the development of habits of payment as control variables. He
has also included both direct and indirect tax rates and the level of national regulations
and the complexity of the tax system into the equation, which he assumed to be the
main factors that led to working on an undeclared basis.
Gutmann’s approach is the second derivation of the Cagan method, although it is
sometimes held to be a method of its own. There are no real reasons for this, because
the two approaches are fundamentally based on the same idea (Schneider & Ernste,
2000). The Guttman approach is a simpliﬁcation of Cagan’s, in which statistical proce-
dures and the effects of other factors are taken out, and changes in the proportion of
cash in the overall money supply are ascribed only to the dynamics of undeclared work.
Both these methods have certain weaknesses. For example, there is no reason to
believe that the velocity of money in payment for declared and undeclared work is the
same, especially since there are different forms of payment (cash and deposits). The
ratio of cash to deposits may be increased because companies learn to optimise the
amount of money in their accounts, in which they are assisted by ﬁnancial innovations,
not because of the rise in undeclared work. There is no proof that it is only cash that is
used in the undeclared work sphere, while the use of deposited money is limited to
declared work. If deposit money is really used for undeclared work, the real level of
undeclared work could be even higher than estimated. Some of these problems are
addressed in the second variant of the monetary approach, the transaction or Feige
approach. The main assumption of this is the assumption of the existence of a constant
link between the volume of transactions in the economy (cash or non-cash) and the size
of GDP (created in both declared and undeclared work). However, shifting the problem
of measuring the undeclared to measuring the volume of overall transactions does not
actually settle it. Measuring the total volume of transactions is also not very simple, par-
ticularly for the cash part of transactions.
Sosic and Faulend (2002) stress that in Croatia there are a number of practical prob-
lems. The monetary approach is based on a long series of monetary data from which it
is possible to derive money demand function and other conclusions about reactions of
habits of keeping local cash with respect to changes in the legislative and tax environ-
ment. But in Croatia, because of the various shocks that have occurred in the still short
post-stabilisation period, like the repatriation of deposits from abroad and the banking
crisis of the end of the 1990s, it is very difﬁcult to expect a reliable correspondence
between monetary variables and variables approximating the level of the regulatory and
ﬁscal burden. Considering the instability of the money demand function in Croatia,
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which is evident from the different parameters, estimated when the estimate is carried
over different periods of time, statistical properties of the monetary variables do not
allow us to use them in estimates of undeclared work dynamics. Sosic and Faulend
(2002) nevertheless opted for the transaction approach, but were faced with new prob-
lems – the reliability of the size of total transactions. The problem is particularly large
for cash transactions. Of course, there are indicators of the average life of Croatian ban-
knotes, depending on the denominations. However, so far there has been no research
attempting to estimate the average number of transactions that is carried out with these
notes, which makes an estimate of the amount of cash transactions practically impossi-
ble. It is due to such problems that Sosic and Faulend (2002) decided to avoid statistical
procedures and test out the simple Gutmann approach using Croatian data. Mentioned
results are primarily of an indicative nature.
The assumptions from which they started are standard for the Gutmann model. They
have assumed that deposit money (i.e. the non-cash component of M1) is used only in
declared work, while cash is used both for declared and undeclared work. Additionally,
cash used for declared work is a linear function of deposit money. A further assumption
relates to the level of undeclared work in the period that they have chosen as the start-
ing period. As the starting level for undeclared work they decided to take 25% of GDP
as recorded in the ofﬁcial economy, which is found to be an average for the period from
1990 to 1995 by the previous study (Ott, 1997). Various estimates for the last year in
this period oscillate around this level, but the average does not deviate very much
(Table 2).
Although the indicators show a large degree of variability, the method indicates a
rising trend in undeclared work during the ﬁve years for which they carried out the
analysis. The absolute level of undeclared work in each year can be increased or
decreased by changing the assumption about its initial level. The results are of course
subject to all the usual criticisms about the use of monetary methods, criticisms that
with respect to Croatia are more than usually important. In the continuation Sosic and
Faulend (2002) devoted more attention to criticisms of monetary methods due to the
widespread dollarisation and they attempted to use the problem of dollarisation con-
structively for a different approach to evaluating dynamics of undeclared work. Mone-
tary methods for estimating the undeclared work UE were developed and their use
started in advanced countries that are not even remotely subject to the problems of dol-
larisation to the extent that exists in many countries with a lower level of per capita
GDP. However, OECD countries encounter problems of a different kind. Large quanti-
ties of their cash circulate abroad, and changes in international cash ﬂows can have a
considerable effect on the success of monetary methods of estimating the UE in these
countries. Because of all the evidence indicating the importance of the amount of for-
eign cash in circulation for undeclared work in dollarised countries, it might be expected
that researchers would have put it at the focus of their UE research. Nevertheless, as far
Table 2. Estimates of the size of the UW for Croatia based on the Gutmann method, with the
employment of domestic monetary aggregates.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
C/M1 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.38
GDPUW 25.0% 24.7% 29.2% 29.8% 34.0% 25.3%
Source: Sosic and Faulend (2002).
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 429
as it is generally known, monetary estimates of the UE in dollarised countries are still
based on local currency data, and awareness of the problems with monetary methods of
measuring undeclared work that are created by dollarisation is often pushed to the side.
In their endeavour to estimate Croatian dynamics of undeclared work, Sosic and
Faulend (2002) used simple assumptions because they are of the opinion that the very
attempt of an estimate based on foreign cash in circulation is a move in the right direc-
tion. Firstly, they assumed that only local currency was used in declared work, while
only foreign currency is used in undeclared work in the form of cash. Further, they sup-
posed that changes in the ratio of the two components of the GDP, that is the GDP cre-
ated in declared work and that generated in undeclared work are in proportion to
changes of the ratios of the estimated amount of foreign cash in circulation and the
domestic monetary aggregate M1, as is shown in this identity:
FCCt=M1tð Þ= FCCt 1=M1t 1ð Þ GDPUWt=GDPDWtð Þ / GDPUWt  1=GDPDWt 1ð Þ
FCC = foreign currency in circulation; M1 = domestic monetary aggregate; GDP = gross
domestic product; UW = undeclared work; DW = declared work
From this assumption it can be derived that the postulation that changes in the
income velocity of the circulation of the domestic monetary aggregate M1 and foreign
cash are proportional. Of course, foreign cash must be used in many transactions such
as the purchase of used residences and cars that could not be considered generators of
undeclared work. In such transactions, most of the taxes to the state are paid, but since
the transactional medium is foreign cash, these transactions do, in a certain way, belong
in the informal sphere. Since they do not contribute to GDP, they do not affect the
income velocity of circulation of foreign cash, and they will not be considered here.
The last of these assumptions is the initial level of undeclared work. In the previous
estimate they started off from the level of 25%, which is what they kept in this one.
Table 3 gives results of an estimate based on estimations of foreign cash in circulation.
While the share of foreign currency in circulation in domestic monetary aggregate
M1 oscillated around 0.30, the share of undeclared work in GDP was around 25%.
3.6. Global indicators methods: electricity consumption
To date, data limitations have conﬁned the use of macro-economic modelling estimates
of unobserved activities in transition countries to those based on variants of the electric
consumption methodology (ECM) most prominently, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996);
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997); Eilat and Zinnes (2002).
The Kaufmann–Kaliberda method. Although the physical input approach has already
been used in underground economy estimates, the application of this method was devel-
oped relatively recently. In order to measure the TEA of a national economy, Kaufmann
Table 3. Estimates of the size of the UW for Croatia based on estimations of foreign currency in
circulation.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
FCC / M1 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30
GDPUW 25.0% 22.0% 26.1% 25.5% 24.9% 25.8%
Source: Sosic and Faulend (2002).
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and Kaliberda (1996) assume that electricity consumption is the best physical indicator.
Total (ofﬁcial) economic activity data as well as electricity consumption data are avail-
able for the majority of the economies. The authors also assume that the electricity con-
sumption is a good indicator of the total GDP trend as short-term elasticity is equal to
one. Therefore, they designate the difference between electricity consumption growth
rate and the ofﬁcial GDP growth rate as an instance of the underground economy. The
criticism of this method includes that electricity is not a signiﬁcant input in certain
underground activities (namely personal and business services), and alternative energy
sources can also be used (such as coal, oil, etc.) and therefore this method only partially
measures the true size of the underground economy. Furthermore, energy production
and consumption are far more efﬁcient today. Finally, there are signiﬁcant differences
and variations in the elasticity ratios between GDP and electricity consumption, both
dynamically and across different countries.
The Lacko method. Lacko (1998) assumes that a certain amount of underground eco-
nomic activity is connected with household electricity consumption. Based on a cross-
country analysis, an econometric regression is estimated. The dependant variable is the
per capita household electricity consumption, and the independent variables are the fol-
lowing: average real per capita expenditure, electricity price in US dollars, number of
heating months, the proportion of the other energy sources consumption and per capita
underground economy output. This last variable is calculated in another regression as a
function of personal income tax ratio, company proﬁts and overall tax burden on goods
and services, as well as the ratio of public expenditure in the GDP and the share of
dependant population in total population. The difference between observed and expected
consumption is assigned to electricity consumption in the underground economy.
Feige and Urban (2003) attempted to replicate and update earlier estimates (Dobozi
& Pohl, 1995; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Johnson et al., 1997;
Kaufmann & Kaliberda, 1996) of unrecorded income based on simple ECM and exam-
ined the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifying assumptions. They found that
simple ECM estimates were highly sensitive to alternative initial conditions (Alexeev &
Pyle, 2003) concerning the pre-transition size of the unrecorded sector and produced
seemingly anomalous negative shares of unrecorded income for a number of transition
countries. They also modiﬁed the simple ECM to allow for changes in electricity prices
and changes in the share of the private and industrial sectors as suggested by Eilat and
Zinnes (2002) and Lacko (1999). These modiﬁcations affected the estimated size and
trajectory of unrecorded incomes, and eliminated some, but not all of the negative val-
ues of the share of unrecorded activities.
Sosic and Faulend (2002) used the electricity consumption method in order to obtain
an estimate of dynamics of undeclared work from sources independent of money aggre-
gate trends to check the consistency of estimates based on monetary methods. In esti-
mating undeclared work with the electricity consumption method they used the
assumption on the unitary elasticity of change in the consumption of electricity to
changes in the overall GDP also used by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). A decision
to base this estimate on overall consumption is motivated by the possibility that some
of the electricity produced is actually stolen, which is thus recorded within losses. At
the end, they also adhered to the assumption that undeclared work came to 25% of
declared work in 1995.
The method by which undeclared work is estimated via electricity consumption has
been subject to criticisms in its simplest form. First of all, not all economic activities
are equally electricity-intensive, while some service industries that are easier to conceal
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or switch into the undeclared work sphere are often labour intensive. Technological
advances that increase efﬁciency reduce the need for electricity, and electricity consump-
tion elasticity compared with changes in GDP can change in some years (Schneider &
Ernste, 2000). Finally, the weather can impinge crucially in some years. Nevertheless,
observation of trends over a longer period of time should cancel out the effect of inter-
year temperature oscillations. Table 4 shows the dynamics of registered real GDP, the
consumption of electricity, and an estimate of the dynamics of undeclared work
expressed by what percentage it constitutes of declared work, derived according to the
consumption of electricity.
Feige and Urban (2003) calculated the share of the unrecorded income in TEA
(YUR/Y) for a group of countries, including Croatia, as estimated by the modiﬁed elec-
tric consumption method (MEC) based on the temporal cross-section estimates. Overall,
the trajectory of the estimates labelled [YUR/Y MEC] display an inverted U-shaped pat-
tern. It appears that the unrecorded sector’s share of TEA grew during the early years of
the transition and eventually declined during the second half of the transition decade.
However this observed temporal pattern is directly affected by the extent to which the
ofﬁcial GDP has been adjusted with imputations for the non-observed sector. The
temporal pattern of the non-observed economy imputations as a fraction of estimated
TEA is also displayed as the series (YIUI/Y MEC).
3.7. Latent variable methods
Lovrinčević, Marić, and Mikulić (2006) estimated the total amount of undeclared work
in Croatia using two approaches. The ﬁrst one is the sum of particular forms of unde-
clared work according to the approach by the Eurostat (N1-N7). Due to the implementa-
tion of conservative assumptions, the results of the mentioned methods could be taken
as a lower estimation threshold of undeclared work. In the second variant, using other
methods of estimation (input method, DYMIMIC method) and average deviations of
result of other methods and Eurostat method, estimated is the higher boundary (thresh-
old) of undeclared work in Croatia. They calculated lower and higher estimation thresh-
olds of undeclared work. The average share of undeclared work in total Gross
Additional Value (GAV) and GDP decreased during the observed period, from 15.4%
GAV (12.4% GAV) in 1998 year to 13.9% GAV (11.2% BDP) in 2002. The economic
sectors with the highest share of UW in GAV in the year 2002 were: Hotels and
restaurants (33.7%), Real estate leases and business services (31.7%), Fishing (26.7%),
Building (21.7%), Other community, social and personal services (19.9%) and
Trade, repairs of motor vehicles and household goods (19.1%). During the observed per-
iod, the share of undeclared work in total GAV increased in the following sectors:
Table 4. Estimates of the dynamics of the UW for Croatia using the electricity consumption
method.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Rate of rise of GDP (Ofﬁcial economy in %) 5.9 6.8 2.5 -0.4 3.8
GDP Index (Ofﬁcial economy) 100.0 105.9 113.1 115.9 115.5 119.9
Rate of rise in electricity consumption (%) 5.7 6.1 4.4 2.4 1.2
Total GDP (declared and undeclared) 125.0 132.2 140.2 146.4 149.9 151.7
Undeclared as percentage of declared work (%) 25.0 24.8 24.0 26.3 29.8 26.5
Source: Sosic and Faulend (2002).
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Hotels and restaurants, Fishing, Building, Manufacturing and energy, Gas and water
supply. The total amount of undeclared work in Croatia in 2002 was HRK 20.1 billion,
which is increase of 18% in comparison to 1998. The most important form is incorrect
reporting HRK 9.0 billion, followed by non-registered (hidden) producers (HRK 5.6
billion) and statistically unavailable data (HRK 2.7 billion). The most signiﬁcant increase
was observed in incorrect reporting, while there was a decrease in the realised amount by
non-registered (hidden) producers (Lovrinčević, Marić et al., 2006). That means that
undeclared work is moving to the ﬁeld of incorrect reporting, mostly tax evasion.
In calculation of a higher estimation threshold of undeclared work, Lovrinčević,
Marić et al. (2006) used the average share of undeclared work (12.1% GDP) according
to Eurostat estimations for EU new member states. The result of all others methods (in-
put electric consumption, DYMIMIC) was 2.15 times bigger that the results of the
Eurostat approach. If the estimation of the grey economy (undeclared work) for Croatia
according to the Eurostat estimation (15.6% GDP) is multiplied with the average share
for other countries (2.15 times bigger), a higher estimation threshold of undeclared work
in Croatia is obtained (33.6% GDP) for the year 2002.
3.8. Tax evasion
One form of unofﬁcial economy is tax evasion. Sanja Madžarevic-Šujster (1997) consid-
ered the forms and extent of the evasion of payment of taxes and contributions. This
writer explained that in Croatia this most often involves declaring lower tax bases, the
payment of wages via banks, unions or in kind, hence evading the payment of taxes
and surtax. The amount of unpaid tax and contributions is very much conditioned by
the source of the income made, that is, by the industrial sector in which the person is
employed. Assuming that the non-payment of taxes and contributions is less common in
large ﬁrms (because of the extent of operations, the need to run complete accounts and
non-cash payments, and the fact that they were until recently either publicly owned or
in mixed ownership), and that the earnings of self-employed persons and entrepreneurs
are larger than those of ordinary employees, the author carried out two simulations.
In the ﬁrst simulation, the amounts of the wages in small and medium-sized ﬁrms
were equated with the wages paid out in large ﬁrms. According to this simulation, tax
evasion and contributions evasion came to 3.7% of GDP in 1994, 4.34% in 1995, and
4.65% in 1996. In the second simulation it is assumed that for the sake of some kind of
social protection the real measure of employment in Croatia is the ﬁgures about active
insured persons at the disposal of the then Retirement and Disability Insurance Fund,
that the monthly receipts of active insured persons were equivalent to the average
receipts in the economy (lower than receipts in the big companies). Thus, as the
difference between actually paid and potential contributions and income tax, evasion of
contributions and income tax as a percentage of GDP was 2.76% in 1994, 3.71% in
1995 and 3.81% in 1996. Madzarevic-Sujster (2002), according to certain assumptions,
carried out similar simulations for the period from 1994 to 2000 (Figure 1). Using the
ﬁrst simulation, she estimates that the amount of evasion of income tax and surtax grew
from 1.5% of GDP in 1994 to 2.7% in 2000, while according to the second simulation
(after an adjustment for the writing off of contributions and the evasion of contributions)
evasion of tax and contribution as a percentage of GDP rose from 4.3% to 5.9%. The
ﬁrst simulation gives a lower limit for the evasion of direct taxes and contributions, and
the second simulation gives a lower limit of the estimate. Thus, a large chunk of income
goes unreported and untaxed. An obvious consequence of tax evasion is the erosion of
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the tax base. Tax evasion also affects the government’s ability to distribute the tax
burden fairly: people who underreport their income may be unfairly receiving beneﬁts
that the government has intended to provide only to those who earn below a certain
amount.
3.9. Methodology for estimate of non-exhaustiveness of national accounts
The classiﬁcation of non-exhaustiveness types in national accounts is based on various
characteristics of the producer, i.e. the way in which data is obtained from producers.
The classiﬁcation of non-exhaustiveness types in national accounts is previously pre-
sented in Table 1. Regardless of the mutual exclusivity of individual forms, in practice
there can also be cases in which individual types of non-exhaustiveness in the national
accounts overlap. For example, there can be some overlapping between types N1 and
N2, as well as between types N1 and N6. The analysis of individual non-exhaustiveness
types aims at insuring a completely exhaustive non-overlapping reporting, which leads
towards the ultimate goal of accuracy and exhaustiveness of GDP ﬁgures. The analysis
of non-exhaustiveness types is not a ﬁnal aim, and neither is the allocation of individual
sources of the underground economy of crucial importance. The importance lies with
countries following a consistent set of procedures in order for the obtained data to be
directly comparable.
Lovrinčević et al. (2011) calculated that the total non-exhaustiveness adjustments in
Croatia in 2000 amounted to HRK 16.6 billion (EUR 2.21 billion) with the inclusion of
illegal activities, or 15.1 billion HRK (EUR 2 billion) where illegal activities are not
included. In the last estimated year (2008) the total unofﬁcial economy amounted to
23.3 billion HRK or 20.4 billion HRK without illegal activities (EUR 3.2 and 2.7 bil-
lion, respectively). Apart from 2003, absolute values of the unofﬁcial economy esti-
mates increased throughout the observed period. On the other hand, the share of the























Informal economy, left axis Tax burden on the economy, left axis
Lower limit of tax evasion, right axis Upper limit of tax evasion, right axis
Figure 1. Tax evasion, tax burden and the share of the informal economy (% of GDP).
Source: Madžarevic-Šujster (2002).
434 P. Bejaković
4. The unofﬁcial economy and economic crisis
The period from 2000 to 2008 can be characterised as a successful one for the Croatian
economy. The development gap in comparison to the EU has narrowed and the overall
macroeconomic environment could be deﬁned as relatively stable. The Croatian econ-
omy in the prerecession period recorded an average economic growth of above 4%, low
inﬂation, decreasing unemployment rate and decreasing public deﬁcit. On the other
hand, the lack of overall competitiveness resulted in a rising current account deﬁcit and
foreign debt. While GDP growth in 2008 was signiﬁcantly lower than 2007, but still
positive, in 2009 GDP growth fell to -5.8%. The sharpest annual contraction was
recorded in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, with a slow down towards the end of the year.
This was primarily the result of a slight positive growth recorded in the last three quar-
ters of 2008. The fall of GDP, as shown in Figure 1 continued also in 2010, but was
milder (1.8%) (Bejaković & Gotovac, 2011).
The overall unemployment rate for the population aged 15–64 fell from 13.1% in
2005 to 8.6% in 2008. In 2009 and 2010 the unemployment rate increased to 9.3% and
to 12% respectively. Compared to men, whose average unemployment rate remained
below 10%, women experience rates of unemployment in the range of 12%. However,
since the economic sectors that suffered most during the crisis are male-dominated, the
percentage increase in the unemployment rate for men in the period 2008–2010 equalled
4.4 percentage points (from 7.1% to 11.5%), while for women it increased by 2.3 per-
centage points (from 10.4% to 12.7%).
The recession, acting through the demand channel had a direct negative impact not
only on the ofﬁcial but also on the unofﬁcial economy. On the other hand, the increases
in the unofﬁcial economy can be explained by other determinants. There are various
factors determining the relative signiﬁcance of the unofﬁcial economy and relation to
the ofﬁcial economy. Theoretical causes of the shadow economy are as follows (Feld &
Schneider, 2010; Frey & Pommerehne, 1984; Schneider & Ernste, 2000):
(a) Burdens on the ofﬁcial economy;
(b) Public sector services;
(c) Tax morality and government controls;
(d) Labour market conditions;
(e) Structural factors.
All of above factors have an impact on the relation between the formal and informal
economy. If the tax burden is rising, we can expect a rising share of the unofﬁcial econ-
omy. The higher the difference between the total cost of labour in the ofﬁcial economy
and after-tax earnings from work, the greater is the incentive to work in the unofﬁcial
economy. Additionally, taxes affect labour-leisure choices and increase labour supply in
the unofﬁcial economy. Empirical evidence on the inﬂuence of the tax burden on the
shadow economy is provided by Schneider (1994, 2005), Johnson et al. (1998), Feld
(2010). An increase of the unofﬁcial economy can lead to reduced public revenues from
taxes which in turn reduce the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and ser-
vices. Ultimately, this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for ﬁrms and individuals
in the ofﬁcial sector, quite often combined with deterioration in the quality of public
goods and of the administration, leading to an even stronger incentive to participate in
the shadow economy.
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In the estimation of the size of the non-ofﬁcial economy (NOE) in Croatia, Klarić
(2011) included, among other possible causes and indicators of the NOE, primarily the
tax burden. It is probably the most frequently used explanatory variable when discussing
the NOE. Certain methods treat taxes as the sole or, at least, the prime reason for enter-
ing into the realms of the non-observed economy. Taxes affect the cost of living, as well
as costs of doing business, and they are incorporated into every price in the ofﬁcial
economy. Tax evasion therefore might seem tempting as a way of increasing one’s
wealth. On the other hand, penalties are put in place for those trying to evade taxes.
Those obligated to pay taxes have to weigh the gains of evasion against the risks of
being caught. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the greater the tax burden, the
greater the willingness to evade it and underground and informal production, for
instance unregistered employment, are more likely to occur. There is an additional rea-
son why it might be especially interesting to observe the inﬂuence taxes have on NOE.
While most economic variables can only be inﬂuenced through a set of measures, the
results of which can be uncertain, the level of taxes can be directly dictated by the
government.
A lower tax morality leads to an increased readiness to become active in the hidden
economy. A growing intensity of public controls and a rise in expected punishment
ceteris paribus reduces the return on hidden activities and therefore has the opposite
effect according to Frey and Pommerehne (1984). Johnson et al. (1997) predict that
ceteris paribus countries with higher general regulation of their economies tend to have a
higher share of the unofﬁcial economy in total GDP. The quality of public institutions is
another key factor of the development of the informal sector. The underground economy
is also very often closely linked to corruption (Lovrinčević, Mikulić, & Budak, 2006).
If labour market conditions are improving in terms of higher labour demand in ofﬁ-
cial sectors, individuals have a stronger negotiation position and ask to be included in
social security schemes. If labour demand is weak, individuals are more concentrated on
short-term perspective (current income) and neglect loss of potential social beneﬁts in
the future. Additionally, the longer ofﬁcial working time, the higher are the opportunity
costs of taking up additional work in the hidden economy. Unemployment beneﬁts also
inﬂuence readiness of workers to participate in ofﬁcial economy. The determinants listed
so far do not apply to all sectors in the same way. Rather, there are certain industries
(particularly those with low capital intensity) in which a higher probability of working
in the hidden economy can be assumed. If a shift in demand increases a relative share
of those industries, an overall increase in the share of the unofﬁcial economy is
expected. Table 5 presents inﬂuence on the unofﬁcial economy and relative importance
of various determinants. Empirical researchers in most cases ﬁnd the tax burden as the
most important determinant of the unofﬁcial economy, followed by tax morale and qual-
ity of state institutions (Lovrinčević et al., 2011).
It is evident that the trend of a decreasing share of the underground economy in
GDP stopped in 2008 and reversed in 2009. This ﬁnding supports the conclusion that
the ofﬁcial and the underground economy in Croatia are substitutes, working in opposite
directions. It is evident that when the underground economy is reduced by 1%, the ofﬁ-
cial GDP ﬁgure will be artiﬁcially increased by 0.48% and vice versa. It means that the
ofﬁcial GDP growth ﬁgures used to be overestimated by an average 0.3% in the period
2001–2008, and underestimated by 0.7 in the period 2009–2010, when the underground
economy increased as a result of the recession. The most important factors inﬂuencing
the underground economy in Croatia (tax moral, tax burden and labour market condi-
tions) worked in the same direction, increasing the share of underground economy in
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period 2008–2010, while they were stable during 2002–2008 period. Furthermore, it
seems that the elasticity of the underground economy in relation to the economic activ-
ity is higher during recessions (period 2009–2010) in comparison to periods of growth
(Lovrinčević et al., 2011).
5. Conclusion
Individual studies of the unofﬁcial economy in Croatia describe in detail the problems
of particular forms in which undeclared work appears and measures needed for their
prevention. Some of them will be mentioned here:
1. Economic policy measures seeking to reduce undeclared work should place pri-
mary interest on the institutional sphere. In order to better understand the unofﬁ-
cial economy in Croatia, it is essential to understand the relation of the state
towards the economy and toward society as a whole. The border line between
the ofﬁcial and the unofﬁcial economy (or declared and undeclared work) in
Croatia is not a problem only because the activities of the ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial
economy are closely connected and because the very development of privatisa-
tion and market transformation inﬂuences the demand for (de)regulation, but also,
because on top of all this, the state itself shows a tendency to operate in the grey
zone (of politics, laws and the economy).
2. Ofﬁcial statistical data signiﬁcantly overestimate economic activity during periods
of growth, while underestimating activity during recessions, making macroeco-
nomic data more volatile and pro-cyclical then they really are. Such volatility
usually gives rise to the overestimations and biased ﬁscal projections in good
times and vice versa. Additional contribution to ﬁscal biasness is the constantly
diminishing share of underground economy in retail trade which give rise to the
overestimation of ﬁscal revenues in value added tax based systems.
3. The state must see that the following goals are realised: (a) high professional
level of state services; (b) complete independence and better organisation and
equipping of the judicial system and the exclusive accountability to Parliament of
highly professional control and inspection services (independent of the govern-
ment); (c) transparency of rules and regulations and of all procedures where the
Table 5. Factors which inﬂuence on the shadow economy according to results of various
empirical studies.
Factors inﬂuencing the shadow economy
Inﬂuence on the shadow economy
(in %)
a b
Increase of the tax burden 35–38 45–52
Quality of state institutions 10–12 12–17
Transfers 5–7 7–9
Speciﬁc labour market regulation 7–9 7–9
Public sector services 5–7 7–9
Tax morale 22–25
Notes: (a) Average values of 12 studies.
(b) Average values of empirical results of 22 studies.
Source: Feld and Schneider (2010).
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possibility of rent seeking is a stimulation to the unofﬁcial economy; (d) possibil-
ity of truly democratic and public control by citizens and their representatives
over all state institutions; (e) rational state expenses in spending public revenue,
but also reduction of over extensive public expenditure (the share of public
expenditure in the GDP); (f) high quality service from the public sector; (g) deci-
sive break with paternalistic capitalism; (h) equal conditions for small ﬁrms and
companies in the capital market so they do not have to look for capital in the
grey market.
4. When it comes to reducing undeclared work in a particular area, such as foreign
trade, the following elements are essential: improvement in the customs services
and implementation of techniques for improving trade statistics, cost analysis
and, consequently, analysis of the price of goods and services, followed by pre-
vention of false invoicing, etc. It is also essential to undertake the necessary
changes in the legal system (eliminate some of the more important shortcomings
in laws and introduce stricter sanctions for illegal economic activities in interna-
tional exchange), to improve ofﬁcial statistics and the efﬁciency and co-operation
between various state bodies.
5. As the recommendations for economic policy, it could be added that research on
tax evasion indicates that the unofﬁcial economy could be reduced by the intro-
duction of value added tax (return of prepaid tax introduces better compliance).
When making decisions about measures, it is more important to prevent the
causes of the unofﬁcial economy than its negative consequences (penalties, intro-
duction of new taxes, etc.) From the liberal point of view, the unofﬁcial economy
will decrease if economic growth, stabilisation, privatisation and restructuring are
realised and if the role of the state in the economy is reduced, if taxes are low-
ered and if the rights the unemployed enjoy are diminished.
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